Speaking with conversational AIs, technologies whose interfaces enable human-like interaction based on natural language, has become a common phenomenon. During these interactions, people form their beliefs due to the say-so of conversational AIs. In this paper, I consider, and then reject, the concepts of testimony-based beliefs and instrument-based beliefs as suitable for analysis of beliefs acquired from these technologies. I argue that the concept of instrument-based beliefs acknowledges the non-human agency of the source of the (...) belief. However, the analysis focuses on perceiving signs and indicators rather than content expressed in natural language. At the same time, the concept of testimony-based beliefs does refer to natural language propositions, but there is an underlying assumption that the agency of the testifier is human. To fill the lacuna of analyzing belief acquisition from conversational AIs, I suggest a third concept: technology-based beliefs. It acknowledges the non-human agency-status of the originator of the belief. Concurrently, the focus of analysis is on the propositional content that forms the belief. Filling the lacuna enables analysis that considers epistemic, ethical, and social issues of conversational AIs without excluding propositional content or compromising accepted assumptions about the agency of technologies. (shrink)

In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a (...) crucial assumption lying behind the argument I used to establish interpersonal extendedness in testimony cases does not apply to beliefs formed through reliance on instruments. In this respect, at least, there appears to be something epistemically distinctive about relying on another epistemic agent. (shrink)

Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that (...) class='Hi'>belief on the part of a group’s members is neither necessary nor sufficient for group belief. In other words, groups are said to be able to believe that p even when not a single individual member of the group believes that p. In this paper, I challenge this view by focusing on two phenomena that have been entirely ignored in the literature: group lies and group bullshit. I show that when group belief is understood in terms of actions over which group members have voluntarily control, as is standardly thought, paradigmatic instances of a group lying or bullshitting end up counting as a group believing. Thus we need to look elsewhere for an adequate account of group belief. (shrink)

Rumors, for better or worse, are an important element of public discourse. The present paper focuses on rumors as an epistemic phenomenon rather than as a social or political problem. In particular, it investigates the relation between the mode of transmission and the reliability, if any, of rumors as a source of knowledge. It does so by comparing rumor with two forms of epistemic dependence that have recently received attention in the philosophical literature: our dependence on the testimony of (...) others, and our dependence on what has been called the ‘coverage-reliability’ of our social environment (Goldberg 2010). According to the latter, an environment is ‘coverage-reliable’ if, across a wide range of beliefs and given certain conditions, it supports the following conditional: If ~p were true I would have heard about it by now. However, in information-deprived social environments with little coverage-reliability, rumors may transmit information that could not otherwise be had. This suggests that a trade-off exists between levels of trust in the coverage-reliability of official sources and (warranted) trust in rumor as a source of information. (shrink)

This article examines the meaningful intervention that Gert-Jan Van der Heiden’s recent book, The Voice of Misery: A Continental Philosophy of Testimony, makes in the developing field of the philosophy of testimony. I argue that this intervention is accomplished through a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the testimonial object and of the demand that it makes upon one who bears witness. In taking such an approach, I argue, Van der Heiden initiates an ontological turn in the field (...) of testimonial theory, shifting the conversation away from a debate about the conditions in which belief in testimony is justified – a debate that has in many ways defined the field for philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. I suggest that Van der Heiden’s account is helpful in demonstrating that, in many cases, doing justice to a testimonial object requires an epistemic-ethical attitude other than belief. The article concludes by developing a few questions for Van der Heiden based on my interpretation of his project, including to what extent his phenomenology of testimony can account for how often our receptivity to testimony depends on the default trust that we have in others by virtue of our fundamental immersion in social life. (shrink)

Children learn and come to know things about the world at a very young age through the testimony of their caregivers. The challenge comes in explaining how children acquire such knowledge. Since children indiscriminately receive testimony, their testimony-based beliefs seem unreliable, and, consequently, should fail to qualify as knowledge. In this paper I discuss some attempted explanations by Sandy Goldberg and John Greco and argue that they fail. I go on to suggest that what generates the (...) problem is a hidden assumption that the standards for testimonial knowledge are invariant between children and cognitively mature adults. I propose that in order to adequately explain how children acquire testimonial knowledge we should reject this hidden assumption. I then argue that understanding knowledge in terms of intellectual skills gives us a plausible framework to do so. (shrink)

Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way as to make the belief genuinely testimonial is bound itself to be unsafe: the lack of safety must transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. If in addition we accept that knowledge requires safety, the result seems to be that (...) one cannot gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony. In a pair of recent papers, however, Sanford Goldberg has challenged this apparently plausible line of thought. Goldberg presents two examples intended to show that a testimonial belief can be safe, even if the testimony on which it is based is unsafe: the lack of safety need not transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. In this paper, I question whether Goldberg’s examples really do show that one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. The problem, I explain, is that both examples appear (for different reasons) to be open to objection. Nevertheless, I argue that although Goldberg’s examples do not establish his conclusion, the conclusion itself is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. I base my argument on an example which differs in structure from Goldberg’s examples, and I argue that due to this difference, my example avoids the problems which Goldberg’s examples face. (shrink)

When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. (...) Reasons for belief arising from non-epistemic sources are controversial, and it’s often argued that it’s impossible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons. However, I will show that even if it is possible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of testimonial insult, for many or most cases, the moral reasons for belief don’t need to be the basis of our doxastic response. This is because there are, in many or most cases, either sufficient epistemic reasons for belief, or sufficient moral reasons for action that guide our response to testimony. Reasons from testimonial insult, in many cases, simply lead to overdetermination. Even if there are such moral reasons for belief, they are therefore practically unnecessary in many cases. There are, though, some cases in which they play an important role in guiding belief. This perhaps surprising conclusion is one unexplored way to defend epistemic over pragmatic reasons for belief. (shrink)

That testimony is one of the principle bases on which many people hold their religious beliefs is hard to dispute. Equally hard to dispute is that our world contains an array of mutually incompatible religious traditions each of which has been transmitted down the centuries chiefly by way of testimony. In light of this latter it is quite natural to think that there is something defective about holding religious beliefs primarily or solely on the basis of testimony (...) from a particular tradition. The present chapter takes up the question of what that defect consists in. I first consider whether religious diversity entails that a religious believer’s testimony-based beliefs are not formed in a suitably epistemically reliable manner even conditional upon the truth of her religion. After casting doubt on this thought I turn to look at the idea that testimony-based beliefs are subject to defeaters in light of awareness of religious diversity, and I suggest that many such beliefs are not obviously so. According to my diagnosis the problem, rather, is that believers who base their religious beliefs just on testimony will be very unlikely to have reflective (that is, second-order) knowledge even if they possess first-order knowledge, and I explain why this is a notable shortcoming. (shrink)

Background Reasonable disagreement about the role awarded to gamete donors in decision-making on the use of embryos created by gamete donation for research purposes emphasises the importance of considering the implementation of participatory, adaptive, and trustworthy policies and guidelines for consent procedures. However, the perspectives of gamete donors and recipients about decision-making regarding research with EGDs are still under-researched, which precludes the development of policies and guidelines informed by evidence. This study seeks to explore the views of donors and recipients (...) about who should take part in consent processes for the use of EGDs in research. Methods From July 2017 to June 2018, 72 gamete donors and 175 recipients completed a self-report structured questionnaire at the Portuguese Public Bank of Gametes. Agreement with dual consent was defined as the belief that the use of EGDs in research should be consented by both donors and recipients. Results The majority of participants were willing to donate embryos for research. Almost half of the donors and half of the recipients considered that a dual consent procedure is desirable. This view was more frequent among employed recipients than among non-employed. Donors were less likely to believe that only recipients should be involved in giving consent for the use of EGDs in research and were more frequently favourable to the idea of exclusive donors’ consent. Conclusions Divergent views on dual consent among donors and recipients indicate the need to develop evidence-based and ethically sustainable policies and guidelines to protect well-being, autonomy and reproductive rights of both stakeholder groups. More empirical research and further theoretical normative analyses are needed to inform people-centred policy and guidelines for shared decision-making concerning the use of EGDs for research. (shrink)

One of the issues of discussion between Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu‛tazila, who differ in many issues, is the relationship between divine command and divine will. Among those who express their opinion on is the Ash‛arī theologian Salmān al-Nīsābūrī. The author, who first cites his sect’s approach on this issue and then explains that Mu‛tazila’s contrary view, adopted the view that the belief, which follows as worship and good deeds commanded by Allah will be the same from his servants. (...) In this matter he basically elaborates three arguments the Mu‛tazila. He states that they build the first of these proofs on the impossibility of the commandment and the will being in a separate direction, and secondly on the fact that the desire for evil is bad. Finally, he adds that they bring evidence from the verses which translates as Allah desires the good of his servants and doesn’t intend his evil deeds. Nīsābūrī, doesn’t pass on these Mu‛tazilite proofs with an immediate answer, but also puts on his agenda possible other objections to those answers that he is giving. He makes the debate very comprehensive, especially on the first evidence he attributes to them. In this sense, he tries to refute the Mu‛tazila argument that the ruler cannot have a will contrary to what he ordered, based on some other rulers who would not want their orders to be fulfilled. Nīsābūrī, who cites some other objections on this issue, states that while there are claims regarding the necessity of order-will harmony, it isn’t consistent that these claimants develop their objections to the examples that show the opposite of their views. In other words, he says that these regarding cases invalidate Mu‛tazila’s claim of necessity. Nīsābūrī includes abrogation in the later stages of the debate and argues that abrogation, which means the abolition of a decree, hits a blow to their understanding of the necessity of order-will. The author also takes objections to his agenda and responds to them. He also examines Mu‛tazila’s approach on the content that if the will is contrary to the order, the rebel and the submissive will be confused, so they must be compatible. Since this claim confirms the meaning that the unbelievers obey Allah’s will with their blasphemy, he makes explanations that obedience will be achieved by order, not by will. On the other hand, the author tries to bind his interlocutors by emphasizing that there’s no room for discussion when it is seen at the relevant verses and seen that Allah doesn’t wish (some) unbelievers to believe. Nīsābūrī, also examines the argument made by Mu‛tazila as to the necessity of conformity between divine command and divine will, that wishing for evil is also evil. Nīsābūrī, who makes relatively more concise explanations on this subject, pointing to the source of this evidence and stating that it is reached from the realm of the perceptible (qiyas bi’l-shāhid). Then, he makes some explanations that the visible realm and the invisible realm cannot be evaluated in the same way and draws attention to the fact that Allah’s being unwise isn’t inferred from the worldly affairs that are happening against Muslims. Nīsābūrī also deals with Mu‛tazila’s evidence for the harmony of divine will and divine order through verses stating that Allah wouldn’t wish his servants to harm. At this stage, he makes comments that the relevant verses are suitable to be evaluated in another way. For this, sometimes makes linguistic explanations, sometimes refers to the content of other verses, and sometimes points to the meaning of the verse used as the evidence. In all of them, he ultimately tries to show that the verses raised by Mu‛tazila do not support their claim. While the author refutes those evidences, he also points out the problems that may arise if the view defended by Mu‛tazila would accepted. In this sense, Nīsābūrī points out that this view will also mean the occurrence of deeds that Allah does not want, and this would bring harm to the divine judgement. As a result, Nīsābūrī underlines that at least Allah’s order towards His servants, whom He knows won’t believe, isn’t in the same direction. (shrink)

Linguist, critic, poet, psychologist, I. A. Richards was one of the great polymaths of the twentieth century. He is best known, however, as one of the founders of modern literary critical theory. Richards revolutionized criticism by turning away from biographical and historical readings as well as from the aesthetic impressionism. Seeking a more exacting approach, he analyzed literary texts as syntactical structures that could be broken down into smaller interacting verbal units of meaning. Practical Criticism, first published in 1929, is (...) a landmark volume in demonstrating this method.Practical Criticism was born of an experiment Richards undertook to discern the psychological foundations of reading and interpretation and a means for readers to discover how they think and feel about poetry. He submitted thirteen poems for analysis, without date or author given, to some four hundred of his Cambridge students. Poets of stature went in undifferentiated from obscure and forgotten figures. The results were mixed at best, with many of the interpretations shockingly bad. These readings were based, in large part, not on the texts themselves but on then-current opinions, presuppositions, theories, and beliefs. The results led Richards to define a set of interrelated mental obstacles to intelligent and accurate reading including "irrelevant associations," "stock responses," "sentimentality," and a general misunderstanding of the purpose or "doctrine" of poetry.Richards' concerns in Practical Criticism went well beyond the merely formal. In the humanist tradition, he believed that the ability to read critically and use language truthfully was culturally regenerative, a necessary skill in the modern world of mass-produced art and advertising. This classic volume will be of interest to teachers of literature, cultural studies specialists, and intellectual historians. (shrink)

Introduction Comparative psychology can generally be defined as the branch of psychology that studies the similarities and differences in the behavior of organisms. Formal definitions found in textbooks and encyclopedias disagree whether comparative psychologists restrict their work to the study of animals or include the study of human behavior. This paper offers an opinion on the major problem facing comparative psychology today – where we will find the next generation of comparative psychology students. Something must be done before we lose (...) access to an entire generation of psychology undergraduates. It is not enough to say that comparative psychology is being “absorbed” in other academic units such as “integrative biology”, “integrative study of animal behavior”, “evolutionary psychology”, “comparative cognition”, or “animal cognition.” Indeed, many of these topics are not primarily studied in psychology departments, wherein comparative psychology students have traditionally received joint training in the principles of behavior and comparative analysis, as applied to both humans and other animals. Consider, for example, the difference between comparative psychology and comparative cognition. Comparative cognition includes features of comparative psychology, but they are not identical. Comparative cognition represents a very specific theoretical position whose validity is based on certain suppositions such as the belief (by definition) that the internal cogni... (shrink)

Purpose. The study seeks to clarify the preconditions for moral and legal decision-making based on the identification of axiological foundations that correlate with the moral perceptions of good and evil and psychological phenomena such as emotions. Theoretical basis of the study is to apply comparative, axiological, systemic methods. This methodological approach allows us to analyze and disclose the essence of the process of moral and legal decision-making on the basis of certain axiological prerequisites and enables to substantiate the connection (...) between the axiological and psychological aspects of taking moral and legal decisions. Originality of the work is to broaden the perceptions of the processes and mechanisms for making moral and legal decisions, which are based on the axiological dimension, in particular on the system of reference individual and social values. The study shows that every necessary moral and legal decision taken by a person is futurologically balanced in the emotional sense, rationally reasoned and morally perceptible in the context of man’s beliefs about good and evil, and realized with necessity in the personal system of reference values that determines the style and manner of individual and social behaviour in the context of material and spiritual values and is an axiological foundation for making all types of moral and legal decisions. Conclusions. Moral and legal decision-making is a social process that is connected with such a social essence of a person as rationality, which gives an opportunity to act axiologically. A person makes moral and legal decisions in a complex way, based on the unity of the moral, axiological and psychological aspects of his worldview, which are grounded on the system of reference values. (shrink)

The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s (...) etiology on its justificational status, McGrath, Siegel, and Vahid ). Our understanding of what we have been told can also be affected by, for example, wishful thinking or irrational background beliefs. I argue that testimonial beliefs based on such states of understanding can thus be rendered unjustified. This is problematic not only for internalist immediate justification views of testimony, but also for some externalist views, such as the form of proper functionalism endorsed by Burge, and Graham. The testimonial version of the argument from etiology, unlike the perceptual variant, does not rest on the controversial hypothesis that perception is cognitively penetrable. Furthermore, there is a stronger case for the claim that testimonial justification can be undermined by etiological effects since, I argue, testimonial beliefs can be based on the background mental states which affect our understanding of what is said, and our states of understanding are rationally assessable. (shrink)

Introduction i This work is a sustained argument for the rationality of belief in God based on the evidence that across various religions down through history people seem to have experienced God.1 If we conf1ne ourselves to rationality ...

This is an examination of the significance of Gandhi's social philosophy for development. It is argued that, when seen in light of Gandhi's social philosophy, the concepts of appropriate technology and basic needs take on new meaning. The Gandhian approach can be identified with theoriginal "basic needs" strategy for international development. Gandhi's approach helps to provide greater equity, or "distributive justice," by promoting technology that is appropriate to "basic needs". Gandhi's social philosophy has been neglected by most development specialists, with (...) only a few exceptions. This analysis attempts to draw out some aspects of M.K. Gandhi's background and his thinking aboutswadeshi andswaraj. Gandhi's ideas, which emerged out of an "Indic" meta-cultural background, are based on an emphasis on equity. Gandhi's syncretic Indic background includes a belief in what Bateson, writing about Bali, Indonesia, has called the "steady state." Development activities should be carried out in a phased manner that does not disturb the beneficial aspects of dynamic equilibrium, but that does promote "positive development." A.T. is particularly useful within the context of a basic needs approach to international development because use of A.T. is probably more likely to lead to equitable growth. The "economic growth" strategy, utilizing "advanced technology" exclusively, has caused unemployment and has not led to effective "trickle down," much less "high mass consumption." In many developing countries the poorest 20% of the population are worse off in 1990 than they were in 1980. By making use of the "advantage of backwardness" and viewing development in terms of long-term impacts, a basic needs approach using A.T. is more likely to lead to a positive impact on third world food systems than a pure "economic growth" strategy. (shrink)

The emphasis that the modernity gives to disengagement and beginning leads one to think that the modernity itself is in fact a culture that initiares crisis. Even if there is no initial crisis, it can be created through the ambivalent nature of modernity. Behind the concept of crisis lies the notion that history is a continuous process or movement that opens the door to nihilistic understanding which stems from the idea of contemporary life and thought alienation through the pessimistic meaning (...) of the word. There is a dialectical relationship between the ideas of modernity and progress, and the decadence, and the main theme of Nietzsche's philosophical career. Since the death of Hegel, who made the idea of crisis plausible, everything is nothing but a counter-movement not only in Germany, but also in Europe. The first of these counter-movements is romanticism with its objection to the mind which is liberated from the bonds of tradition. The main thesis of the present article is, between reactiveness of romanticism -on the surface- and the modernity; from one side romanticism's consuming modernity, which is its mirror image, while at the same time feeding from it and modernity's manipulating the ideas developed against it and monopolizing them thanks to its ambivalent nature. For this purpose, following an an anti-enlightenment thinker Nietzsche's, anti-romantic footsteps which at the same time feeds from the romantic heritage, an attempt will be made to analyze the relationship between modernity and romanticism. Another goal of this article is to allow a comparison of how the intellectual development in the West finds its response on the modernization process of our country by probing how the modernization experience of early period Islamist's who experienced this process in a feeling of "backwardness" and with a wounded consciousness and anxiety has led to a shallow romantic worldview. SummaryRomance and romanticism are the main topics of this article. Romanticism is a period, whereas romance is a spiritual attitude not limited to this period, therefore, even today it’s existence is felt. In other words, it is not specific to the Germans. This term is often used to correspond to certain aspects of European intellectual life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance between 1790 and 1850. In its extremely diverse definitions, the most "romantic" definition in our opinion, belongs to Novalis: “I'm romanticizing by giving a high meaning to ordinary things, a mysterious reputation to the ordinary, the honor of the unknown to the known, an infinite look to the finite.” The rejection of existing social reality, the experience of loss, the melancholic longing and the search for loss are the main components of the romantic motive. This study is based on the argument that there is a dialectical relation between romanticism and modernity, which is known as an opposing movement against enlightenment thought. The intellectual feature, which contains the opposite of modernity itself, makes this argument plausible. In addition, the view of modernity as a crisis culture due to the emphasis on disengament and beginnings offers us the possibility to establish a relationship between modernity, which accepts itself as decadence, and romance. Behind the concept of crisis lies the idea that history is a continuous process or movement opening the door to the nihilist understanding in which modern life and thought are alienated in a pessimistic sense. Thus, Allan Megill defines historicism as a prerequisite for nihilism. According to the author, Prophets of Extremity, if the history has no direction to be changed, maintained or lost when wandering in history, it also cannot have a "crisis". The suggestion of "God is dead" is the most concise expression of this crisis. In this crisis state of nihilism, it is a completely forlorn condition of living in the present. Today, which is in the absolute forlorn state; the savior declares his belief that he is devoid of all sorts of features, things that let us reconcile with the current situation of things. In the face of this situation, when people see that the present becomes completely forlorn, they move in two opposite directions with a desire to regenerate culturally: They either have to go back to the past or head for the future. However, every attempt to determine what the future or the past posess will require them to be real, belonging to the present. This will return us to the forlorn state. Nietzsche embraces both opposing sides, but does not attempts choose between them. This is the place where Nietzsche dictates that today is corrupt taking a radical attitude against romanticism fed by the notion of crisis. The fact that modernity has given up its critique of reason, which is revealed by its dialectic, had a great influence on Nietzsche's putting distance between himself and romantics. That is to say, in response to enlightened thought, although romantics speak of unity, apparently, they could not prevent emergence of emotion against mind, local against the universal, individual against social, in other words, the emergence of the second values, which they believed that these were belittled and despised by Enlightenment. Therefore, romantics seem like they could not save themselves from being caught in the web of dialectics in the account they entered that is based on the subject-object distinction in cartesian thought. It is because modernity acts with the consciousness that the life is established on the occurrence and decadence. Based on this, we can say that decadence is inevitable. This decadence (distortion) from the outside may be through movements developed against it, or experienced within itself (even if no one attempts to destroy it). Modernity, with the awareness that it cannot escape from the decadence, wants to arbitrate itself by turning this decadence in its favor by manipulating it. In other words, the modernity dramatizes the feeling of crisis considering itself decadence and the seemingly contradictory ideas of avant-garde and decadence become almost synonymous. It must be the reason why Nietzsche identifies modernity with decadence Modernity manages to put the decadence in its body at the center of attraction by producing self-opposing movements, monopolizing and manipulating. In short, both romanticism and avant-garde movements are the movements that are emerged not against modernity but from itself. Just like an apple worm, they both consume modernity and feed on it. They act as a mirror. Although they seem to criticize, as movements that have emerged from it, they allow the modernity to complete and correct the deficiencies. As a result of this, we can say that romantic critical movements are developed against the world and are shaped by modernity, beginning with the idea of enlightenment, and moved forward in the track of modernity.While romanticism developed in the West as opposed to modernity, in Ottoman-Turkish thought, it was seen as the rhetoric of retardation and regretting of backwardness from civilization. It is inevitable that the experience of modernization in a sense of backwardness, with a wounded consciousness and urgency, will open up space for romance. In our modernization adventure starting with Tanzimat, it is a fact that there has not been a drastic reckoning due to Enlightenment on an intellectual basis, industrialization on an economic basis, programs of revolutionary and nationalist formations on a political basis. Therefore, in Turkish thought, it is not possible to talk about a critical tradition developed against modern paradigm. The status of being audience to what was being experienced in Europe, resulting from superiority was transformed into grudge due to the defeats in the military field. Due to the decadence experienced in the present, inability to find the solution to the problems of its age, melancholic state of mind because of being stuck in the golden age experienced in the past, in the case of a preference, led to a romantic world view because of the appeal of its simplicity to imitate what was once lived in the past. Thus, it is very natural that the direction of Namık Kemal, the cult personality of Islamist-Turkish thought, is towards the past even when talking about progress and civilization. Seeing the 19th century Europe as a re-implementation of ideas and institutions that are actually Islamic, Namık Kemal, in our opinion, showed us a clear example of a typical Islamist romanticism and an example of occidentalist approach regarding that the West learned the civilization from Muslims. In fact, the exact equivalent of this approach displayed in Turkish cogito without even knowing that it is romantic, emerging in the personality of Namık Kemal and in the feeling of backwardness,with a hectic and injured consciousness, is kitschization. So much so that, the state of being kitsch also explains the current situation of Islamic geography which is far from creating a tradition for at least a century, and it clearly tells the usual romantic end. (shrink)

We contrast person-centered categories with objective categories related to physics: consciousness vs. mechanism, observer vs. observed, agency vs. event causation. semantics vs. syntax, beliefs and desires vs. dispositions. How are these two sets of categories related? This talk will discuss just one such dichotomy: consciousness vs. mechanism. Two extreme views are dualism and reductionism. An intermediate view is emergence. Here, consciousness is part of the natural order (as against dualism), but consciousness is not definable only in terms of physical mass, (...) length, and time (as against reductionism). There are several detailed theories of emergence. One is based on the Great Chain of Being and on organic evolutionary hierarchy. The theory here is based instead on the concept of relational holism in quantum mechanics. The resulting brain model has two interacting systems: a computational system and a quantum system (a Bose-Einstein condensate), perhaps interacting via EEG waves. Thus, we need both person-centered and matter-centered categories to describe human beings. Some possible experimental tests are discussed. (shrink)

In the present study, we tried to deal with the controversial concept of Alevism. Over the years, it has drawn our attention that controversial concepts have increased remarkably in various articles and studies. Especially heterodoxy, orthodoxy, syncretism, etc. It has been seen that the main concepts come to the fore as the main discussion axis in Alevism studies. However, without knowing what these concepts are, Alevism is being dragged into completely different channels with the tendency of slogans such as "Alevism (...) is heterodoxy, Alawism is syncretism". From this point of view, the need to deal with controversial concepts that create the hidden agenda has emerged. From this point of view, we tried to deal with the main platform concepts and discussions encountered in Alevism studies. In particular, we tried to deal with the controversial concepts formed around the speculations produced by the West and that create the hidden agenda. The Ottoman Safavid rivalry attracted the attention of Europe which sought to expand its research and experience in the field. To date, incomparable literature has been produced in this field. Over time, this literature has become a reference source for modern Alevism studies. Although these studies are partially objective, the ambassadors, clerics, travelers, and researchers who wrote them could not escape the influence of the educational, cultural, and religious political perspective from which they came. This accumulation, which was transferred to the present over time, was transmitted to other generations and formed a tradition of perception. Alevism, which was condemned to vicious circles such as sectarianism, left-wing radicalism, etc., was included in the script of studies that aimed at politicization, marginalization, and conceptual distortions by separating it from the religion of Islam. But at the same time, the changes in knowledge and methods produced by each period were reflected in this literature. In this context, the research products on Alevism have formed the information infrastructure in politicization and orientation activities. This long-standing interest of the Europeans eventually allowed the emergence of new concepts and some evaluations from their own perspectives. Due to the lack of systematic theology of Alevism and its structure as a mythological theological understanding based on oral literature and traditions, no consensus could be reached on the definition. As a natural result of this, Alevism operates with the belief that it is in a race to be defined by different people and groups, and each one of them is the right one. Thus, Alevism is an emotional state where everyone can speak and even feel themselves in absolute truth. As a method, we tried to examine the leading controversial concepts with their current counterparts in a concrete way, so that they can find concrete answers in the minds of researchers. In addition, we have tried to deal with the works that set the agenda in the past and today. Thus, it will reflect the general view of the controversial concepts of Alevism. This situation of Alevism has attracted the attention of orientalist researchers (George White, Irène Mélikoff, Marcus Dressler, Hans Lucas Kieser) in the historical process, and they have shown interest in this field with political, ideological, religious, and other motives. While doing this, they preferred to use the concepts found in the history of Christianity and Judaism in the field of Alevism. These researchers have used the historical understanding and patterns of their cultures, such as Christianity and Judaism, to which they originally belonged, in interpreting Alevism. All these approaches prevent the correct perception of Alevism and lead to an environment of mental confusion and chaos. It has caused Alevism to move away from the scientific understanding it deserves. (shrink)

The article that discusses the issue of culturalism as an element of the idea of representation tries to examine a concept, which claims to represent reality through conceptualization, from scratch, or by going to the bottom in a manner of excavation. Foucault's archaeology was chosen as the most suitable method for this excavation activity. Because the archaeological method does not make a historical or meta-historical claim beyond the truth; it does not impose the necessary violence of the method on its (...) object. It grasps its object in its singularity, and most importantly, it thinks and suggests that the truth is no more than an invention. This archaeological study on the concept of culture tries to reveal the difference between the current meaning of the concept and its etymological origin and to grasp it in its singularity. In this way, the problematic relationship between the concepts that man invented and applied while engaging in understanding things that are happening around him will be revealed. Conceptualization is inherent in the idea of truth, which is based on absolutism and is no more than an invention, while ultimately subordinating the particular to the universal. While the article reveals the intolerance of the act of dichotomous thinking, which operates as a product of the effort to represent the truth, as in the nature-culture distinction, it acts according to the approach known as deconstruction in social sciences. In a representative thought, truth is what can actually be represented, presenting itself to the observer as an object of display. The fact that the understanding of truth is based on essentialist principles such as absolute, unchangeable, fixed, universal thanks to Plato makes an idealized representation inevitable. In fact, intellectual endeavors such as conceptualization, abstraction, and generalization mean the idealization of the concrete, singular, and unique by detaching it from its context. It can be said that underlying the idea of representation is the belief that the human mind can grasp the essence of things and therefore can represent them in thought, depending on the idea that truth is rational. As is, it is a thought that tries to keep realism in its hands, blesses it, and strives with all its might to declare its divine absolutism. Ultimately, while the mechanism of representation operates for the stable, it acts with the aim of establishing dominance. The distinction between the representative and the represented is ultimately the product of an anthropocentric perspective. Thanks to this distinction, it is inevitable that everything except the observer subject becomes the object of study. This point of view, believed to be one and universal, requires the fixation of the object of study. It can be said that the idea of representation, which signifies the ideal of absolute truth, underlies today's issues that are based on differences, such as language, religion, race, and gender, that have always been on the world agenda. As the products of representative thought, both binary categorization based on distinction such as nature and culture, and the concept that implies a direct relationship between thought and the outside world, realism is a state of alienation in which whatever is related to the human being ceases to belong to it and is used against it. The reification made possible by the distinction between the representative and the represented is actually nothing but alienation. It can be said that the rooted problem of the world of thought and the peoples of the world since Platonism is that reification and commodification have become so universal that they seem almost like natural, organic entities, and forms. The attempt of representative thought, which confines external reality to the conceptual world, to impose a framework on reality, breaks the connection with reality, and moreover, by being guided by concepts and abstractions, it builds iron cages around the human being. The insistence of Western thought on representation, no matter if it is true or false, no matter it is accepted or not, has led to the radical consequence of the abolition of certainty over reality. Today, the world of thought has evolved from the representation of the truth, which implies the idea that there is a necessary connection between the order of things and the order of words, to the reality of representation, where the boundary between reality and image is abolished, the reality is aestheticized and transformed into images, and society ultimately becomes cultural. With an entry into the cultural turn, everything has become cultural and conventional in the postmodern period. (shrink)

Suyolcu-zāde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was an important sûfî poet being a member of Ismā‘īl Rūmī branch, the sect of Qādiriyya. He carried out the duty of spiritual and ethical guidance at Qādiriyya Lodge in Tekirdağ. Besides his sûfî character, he was a poet having an extensive knowledge about the theoretical and aesthetical bases of Dīwān literature. The only original copy of Nahrī’s Dīwānçe including his poems registered in the Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. There are forty-five Turkish, twelve Arabic (...) and three Persian poems by Nahrī in this copy. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of Nahrī’s poems in Dīwānçe in the light of the analysis on some poems that we chose. Any study was not found about the poet’s life and poems in the literature review we made. In this study, poems are classified according to the verse form and the language, and the number of couplets, type of prosody, form, style and content of the chosen poems are evaluated accordingly. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the Religious-Sûfîstic belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī and inform the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century.Summary: Suyolcu-zâde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was a member of Qādiriyya Dervish Convent in Tekirdag where he was born. He became the head sheikh of this convent following his father Sheikh Muḥammad Efendi and worked for the convent in several ways. Nahrī Aḥmad moved back to his hometown in 1182/1768-1769 after completing his Hajj duty and died soon after that. Nahrī had two works according to Osmanlı Müellifleri (Ottoman Authors) and it is stated that the first one of these two works is about “unity of existence”. It should be mentioned that we haven’t found a copy of this work yet. The other work of Nahrī is his Dīwānçe, which includes his poems. The only copy of this significant work is registered in Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. In this study, we had the chance to determine a third work of Nahrī which has never been mentioned in the related literature. This third work that we determined is based on the information in an Arabic poem on the page 21a of the poet’s Dīwānçe. This book that we determined is an interpretation book completed in 1166/1752-53 but Nahrī Aḥmad didn’t mention the name of the work. Nahrī Aḥmad was a spiritual guide and sufi, and he was assigned to the duty of showing the true path in dervish lodge following his madrassa education, learning Qādiriyya lodge’s morals and methods and completing his “spiritual journey”. Besides these, he was a significant poet who could write poems in Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages and he was literary competent who knew the theoretical and aesthetic rules of Dīwān literature and used these features professionally in his works. When Nahrī’s poems are analyzed, it can be seen that he adopted the understanding of existence, knowledge and belief based on Islamic Sufism. Besides, it can be seen that he internalized the significant Religious-Sufi Turkish literature figures including especially Yūnus Emre.In the copy of his Dīwānçe, registered in Vatican Library, there are forty-five Turkish, twelve Arabic and three Persian poems. There are two other poems that weren’t written by Nahrī in the same work. These poems were written by a poet with penname of ‘Ᾱrif in the period when Nahrī’s son Muḥammad Muṣlih al-Dīn was the head sheikh in the same Dervish convent. These historical poems are significant as they describe the re-building of ruined Tekirdag Qādiriyya convent after Nahrī’s period. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe on the basis of chosen poems. As far as we could determine, there is no other study on Nahrī’s works. Nahrī’s Dīwānçe wasn’t a kind of rearranged work of collected poems. Therefore, we classified the poems in terms of the form and language and evaluated the number of couplets, aruz prosody, shape, type and content. Poems of Nahrī in Dīwānçe in terms of verse style are: Four Turkish, three Arabic, one Persian ode, one Turkish compounded stanza, seventeen Turkish, nine Arabic and one Persian major stanza, three Turkish five-line stanzas, two Turkish pentastichs, eighteen Turkish and one Persian lyric.Nahrī Aḥmad wrote five-line stanzas for three of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s lyrics and one of Bāqī’s lyrics. He wrote parallel poems about one pentastich, one lyric and one other poem written in a specific style of blank verse of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Besides, there is also an original poem that is quite unique in the work. Nahrī wrote five couplets before each verse in Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s ode which resulted in the creation of a common ode. Poems in Dīwānçe are contextually religious-Sufi based. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Ismā‘īl Rūmī who was the founder of the order of Rūmiyya branch and other sheikhs of Qādiriyya dervish order are the main names mentioned in the poems. One other significant point in Nahrī’s poems is that he had a deep love and respect for Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. There are praises, quintets and parallel poems about Miṣrī in Dīwānçe which shows Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s effect on his work. This effect is so great that it covered not only the content but also there are the signs of the effect in terms of metaphoric language, words and verses. It can be said that ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī and Niyāzī-i Miṣrī, a member of Khalwatī order, were two significant names that surrounded the mental world of Nahrī, located in the texture of his poems and gave characteristic features to his works. There is a great number of historical poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe. He wrote twenty-six historical verses about various historical issues such as birth and death, construction of mosque, dervish monastery, zawiya, pavilion, repairing of mansion, renovation of dervish convent, enthronement of Sultan and appointment of Grand Vizier. Also, there are some other important parts in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe such as invocation, praise and self-adulation.Although there are not many poems in the previously mentioned copy in Vatican Library, there are various names mentioned in these poems. When these poems are analyzed, it can be seen that there are the names of some prophets, some companions of Prophet Muḥammad such as ‘Alī, Ja‘far al-Sādiq, some Persian legendary characters such as Afrāsiyāb, Rustem and Anūshirwān, some Sufi names such as Manṣūr al-Hallaj, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Shams al-Dīn of Tabrīz, Ḥācī Bektash Velī, Ibn al-‘Arabī and Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī, philosopher Galen and famous love heroes Laylā and Majnūn. That is to say, the poet has a rich world of references. On the other hand, there are the names of some works mentioned in Dīwānçe. Epistle of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī named Devre-i ‘Arshiyya, and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya are the other names mentioned in the work. Name of the places included in Nahrī’s poems are: Aden, Aqmescit, Baghdad, Baghcesaray, Baṭḥā, Balkh, Dimashq, Ḥijāz, Iraq, Iran, Cairo, Ken‘ān, Karbalā, Qılburun, Crimea, Kirmān, Egypt, Nemce, Rūm, Sanaa, Shām, Yemen. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the religious-sûfî belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Moreover, it informs the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century. (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa del problema de cuál pueda ser la naturaleza de la creencia y cuál la mejor explicación de su normatividad. Se analizan diversas teorías que desarrollan el modelo ¿estado más contenido¿, y se presenta como alternativa una concepción de filiación wittgensteiniana que entiende la creencia como acción simbólica y expresiva. This paper is devoted to the question of the nature of belief, and what the best explanation of its normativity is. Several theories based on the (...) model "state plus content" are analysed, and is presented a wittgensteinianan conception which understands belief as symbolic and expressive action. (shrink)

Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing (...) this, forms the belief that the house is on fire and consequently exits the building at speed. Clearly, a great deal of our beliefs are gained via testimony, and if the epistemic status of our testimonybased beliefs were to be called into question en masse, then this would present us with quite a predicament. It is thus essential that we have some plausible account of the epistemology of testimony. Our primary focus will be on the justification for our testimony-based beliefs, though along the way we will say a little about other relevant epistemic notions like epistemic entitlement as well. (shrink)

Based on ten years of research, The Touch of the Past considers how historically traumatic events uniquely summon forgetting and remembrance. Within a specific focus on events of systemic mass violence, Roger Simon examines how testimonies of historic events influence learning as communities struggle with "difficult histories." The Touch of the Past is a serious and compelling contribution to research in education, historical consciousness, and memory/trauma studies.

Unlike other sources of evidence like perception and memory, testimony is intimately related to natural language. That intimacy cannot be overlooked. In this chapter, I show how cross-linguistic considerations are relevant to the epistemology of testimony. I make my case with declaratives containing grammaticalized evidentials. My discussion has a negative and a positive part. For the negative part, it is argued that some definitions of testimony are mistaken because they do not apply to testimony offered by (...) a declarative containing an evidential. The positive component discusses a new puzzle noted by McCready (2015) that evidentials raise about the justificatory status of testimony-based beliefs. (shrink)

Traditional empiricist analyses of the source of scientific objectivity were based on two guiding themes: that a claim can be objective only if it is tested against some independent touchstone, and that observation provides that touchstone. The issue of objectivity arises here only for beliefs that are formulated as propositions or sets of propositions, and the standard view demands that objective beliefs make claims about entities that exist independently of those beliefs, and whose properties can be determined and compared (...) with the content of the beliefs under examination. In addition, it is demanded that the means of acquiring information about the entities in question be logically independent of the beliefs being tested. For example, if the belief that my typewriter has forty-five keys is to be objective, the typewriter must, in some sense, exist independently of any of my beliefs about it, and, although as a practical matter I might not check how many keys the typewriter has unless I happened to be testing some hypothesis, the procedure for determining the number of keys must not presuppose any of my beliefs about the number of keys. These demands hold whether we take such entities as my typewriter to be material objects that exist completely independently of our awareness of them and with which we somehow make contact through impressions, Machian elements, sense-data, or sensations. For even among those empiricists who hold that we ultimately perceive only our own sensations, it is still maintained that our beliefs in no way determine what sensations will occur at a given time. (shrink)

This essay explores the universal cognitive bases of biological taxonomy and taxonomic inference using cross-cultural experimental work with urbanized Americans and forest-dwelling Maya Indians. A universal, essentialist appreciation of generic species appears as the causal foundation for the taxonomic arrangement of biodiversity, and for inference about the distribution of causally-related properties that underlie biodiversity. Universal folkbiological taxonomy is domain-specific: its structure does not spontaneously or invariably arise in other cognitive domains, like substances, artifacts or persons. It is plausibly an innately-determined (...) evolutionary adaptation to relevant and recurrent aspects of ancestral hominid environments, such as the need to recognize, locate, react to, and profit from many ambient species. Folkbiological concepts are special players in cultural evolution, whose native stability attaches to more variable and difficult-to-learn representational forms, thus enhancing the latter's prospects for regularity and recurrence in transmission within and across cultures. This includes knowledge that cumulatively enriches (folk expertise), overrides (religious belief) or otherwise transcends (science) the commonsense ontology prescribed by folkbiology. Finally, the studies summarized here indicate that results gathered from “standard populations” in regard to biological categorization and reasoning more often than not fail to generalize in straightforward ways to humanity at large. This suggests the need for much more serious attention to cross-cultural research on basic cognitive processes. (shrink)

Abu Muhammad Ali b. Ahmed b. Hazm al-Andalusi (d. 456/1064), the greatest exponent of the Ẓahiriyya school, was a scholar producing important works with his identity as a jurist, hadith scholar, historian, literary man, and poet. He also persistently defended the understanding of Ahl as-Sunna against the sects that emerged within Islamic thought as he defended the superiority of Islam against other religions. In his works, he covered almost every topic of the kalam science; in this context, he was especially (...) interested in topics related to the possibility of prophethood, the prophethood of Muhammad and his being the last representative of the prophethood chain. Therefore, this study, based mainly on his works such as al-Fasl, al-Usul wa'l-Furu, ad-Durr fi ma Yecibu i'tikaduhu and Ilm al-Kalam ala Mazhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'a, deals with the topics of the possibility of prophecy, the prophethood of Prophet Muhammad, and the role and importance of miracles in proving it in the view of Ibn Hazm. Almost all Islamic scholars have based their systems for recognizing prophets on the evidence of miracles. According to them, a person who claims to be a prophet must bring extraordinary evidence to confirm his claim, and it is necessary for him to do so in order to make his opponents religiously responsible. For an event to be considered evidence that confirms the prophet's claim and to be called a miracle, it must have some characteristics, such as: it must be a divine act; it must appear in an extraordinary manner; it must occur together with the claim of prophecy and challenge; and it must occur immediately after the claim of the prophet. Therefore, it is believed that evidence that possesses these characteristics can prove the correctness of the claimant without needing any other evidence. The kalam scholars only call those events as miracles, which have the characteristic of challenging the dozens of evidences that prove the prophet's truthfulness. Therefore, it is without a doubt that the concept of miracle is a special concept invented by kalam scholars. When looking at Ibn Hazm’s views on the subject, which form the backbone of the study, it is necessary to state the following: Firstly, Ibn Hazm explains that prophecy is possible, that God chooses and sends messengers among the people, and that there is no difference among the prophets in terms of belief principles. Ibn Hazm emphasizes the role of miracles in identifying prophets and bases his system on this principle. However, he does not show much care in using the term "miracles" in the way that Kalam scholars accept it and does not aim to explain or list the characteristics or attributes of miracles as seen in Kalam books. He uses the term "miracles," which have been conceptualized over a long period of time, for every extraordinary event that belongs to the prophets, without considering these sensitivities. The most striking aspect of Ibn Hazm's understanding of miracles is that he does not consider the attribute of challenge, which is defined as a condition of a miracle, as necessary. He criticizes those who accept the attribute of a challenge as an essential part of miracles and argues that such an understanding would limit the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad. If the attribute of the challenge is accepted as a condition, then extraordinary events such as the blessing of food and drink, the moaning of wood in the mosque, and some animals coming and expressing their complaints would be excluded from the scope of miracles. This would mean limiting the evidence of Prophet Muhammad's prophecy. According to him, the creator of extraordinary events is God, and He creates them only to confirm His messengers. The events that occur in the hands of a person who claims to be a prophet should be considered a miracle. Therefore, he has named every event that occurred through the prophets as a miracle, regardless of its context and nature. In conclusion, according to Ibn Hazm, there are two types of events that occur in nature: Normal events and miraculous events. He refers to the latter as miracles and limits them to only occurring in the hands of prophets. He believes that events that occur in the hands of prophets, whether they possess the characteristic of tahaddî or not, should be referred to as miracles. Events that occur in the hands of people other than prophets do not possess the characteristics of miraculous events. If such events are claimed to be miraculous, the evidence of the prophets will be damaged. Therefore, Allah creates these events only for His messengers. Therefore, in the view of Ibn Hazm, concepts such as miracles of saints (karamat), magic, and divine help (maunat) do not have a counterpart. In fact, his attitude coincides with the Mu'tazilite tradition. He tries to prevent criticism that can be directed at miracles by assigning miraculous events only to prophets. (shrink)

As physicians encounter an increasingly diverse patient population, socioeconomic circumstances, religious values and cultural practices may present barriers to the delivery of quality care. Increasing cultural competence is often cited as a way to reduce healthcare disparities arising from value and cultural differences between patients and providers. Cultural competence entails not only a knowledge base of cultural practices of disparate patient populations, but also an attitude of adapting one's practice style to meet patient needs and values. Gender roles, relationship dynamics (...) and boundaries are culture specific, and are frequently shaped by religious teachings. Consequently, religion may be conceptualised as a cultural repertoire, or dynamic tool-kit, by which members of a faith adapt and negotiate their identity in multicultural societies. The manner in which Islamic beliefs and values inform Muslim healthcare behaviours is relatively under-investigated. In an effort to explore the impact of Islam on the relationship between patients and providers, we present an Islamic bioethical perspective on cross-gender relations in the patient-doctor relationship. We will begin with a clinical scenario highlighting three areas of gender interaction that bear clinical relevance: dress code, seclusion of members of the opposite sex and physical contact. Next, we provide a brief overview of the foundations of Islamic law and ethical deliberation and then proceed to develop ethicolegal guidelines pertaining to gender relations within the medical context. At the end of this reflection, we offer some practice recommendations that are attuned to the cultural sensitivities of Muslim patient populations. (shrink)

This is the first complete English translation of the Jami al-hikmatayn, written in Persian, the final, and crowning, work of the great poet, philosopher, and Ismaili missionary Nasir-i Khusraw (1004-1077). Twin Wisdoms Reconciled was written at the request of the emir of Badakhshan 'Abu al-Ma'ali 'Ali ibn Asad' who was perplexed by the questions in a long philosophical ode written a century earlier by Abu al-Haytham Jurjani, an obscure Ismaili author. The ode consists of a series of some 90 questions (...) on a wide range of subjects, from logic and metaphysics to medicine, cosmology, and physics, as well as esoteric Ismaili doctrine. Nasir-i Khusraw's text takes the form of a commentary on certain astutely selected lines. Twin Wisdoms Reconciled represents yet another example of the author's lifelong endeavour to transform Persian philosophical prose into a deft and nuanced instrument of expression. The work has not been as extensively studied as Nasir-i Khusraw's other major theological and philosophical treatises, all written in his final exile in Badakhshan, in part perhaps because of its textual difficulties. Twin Wisdoms Reconciled survives in a single manuscript of dubious accuracy in the Aya Sofya collection, Suleymaniyye Library, Istanbul. The present translation is based on the critical edition of the text produced by Henry Corbin and Mohammed Mo'in in 1953, but with frequent reference to the unique original manuscript. Twin Wisdoms Reconciled represents an endeavour to reconcile two apparently opposed forms of knowledge: the knowledge accorded by revelation and exegesis and the knowledge gained by reason. Seeing that "the bazaar of wisdom" stands empty because of the mutual incomprehension of traditional theologians and Aristotelian philosophers, Nasir-i Khusraw stepped boldly forward to reinvigorate that desolate marketplace. His final work, written in 1070, is thus a testimony as well as an exposition of his mature thought. (shrink)

Diverse beliefs about the nature and essence of scientific truth are pervasive in the nursing literature. Most recently, rejection of a more traditional and objective truth has resulted in a shift toward an emphasis on the acceptance of multiple and subjective truths. Some nursing scholars have discarded the idea that objective truth exists at all, but instead have argued that subjective truth is the only knowable truth and therefore the one that ought to govern nursing's disciplinary inquiry. Yet, there has (...) been relatively little critical debate or dialogue about the implications of adopting subjective and multiple truths as a maxim to govern the discipline. In this paper we examine what it might mean to adopt subjective forms of truth as the only knowable truths for nursing, and to accept the possibility of multiple co-existing realities. We understand the implications of such a philosophical stance for the epistemological basis of a practice science to be considerable, therefore we consider what it might mean for a practice-based discipline such as nursing to remain ambiguous on the question of truth, and examine the implications of failing to achieve consensus on what constitutes a truth claim. On the basis of this examination, we urge a cautious approach to the extremes of either position and argue for a more thoughtful and rigorous dialogue about ‘truth’ and knowledge in nursing practice, education, and research. (shrink)

In terms of classical tafsir literature, it is possible that the speeches made to a person or group in the Qurʾān carry messages for other individuals or groups. According to some approaches that emerged in the modern period, when the speech was made and to whom it was directed not only determine the meaning, but also limits it. This dilemma has to be based on the theoretical dimension. The most obvious example of the transition of the speech from direct (...) counterpart to the other is the transition of the speeches made to the unbelievers to the believers. Therefore, in this study, the possibility of the transcendence of the speech in the Qurʾān will be handled in the context of the messages for believers in the speeches directed to the unbelievers. One aspect of the issue of the transcendence of the speech in the Qurʾān can be explained by the style that the Qurʾān follows. However, the subject should also be based on linguistic aspects. As a matter of fact, the expansion of the speech can sometimes be related to the meanings of words and sometimes with the possibilities and literary aspects of language, and sometimes with an analytical effort. In this study, the related examples will be analyzed and it will be revealed that the transition between the speeches in the Qurʾān is possible in terms of the style of the Qurʾān. In the study, the methodological findings related to the linguistic aspects of the issue will also be studied.Summary: The discourse that the Qurʾān is an address by God makes different associations in terms of classical literature and some modern methods of understanding. In the works of classical method and rhetoric, a theoretical framework is drawn around the nature, arbitrariness, conditions and types of the book. In this context, the varieties, indications and scopes of the addresses in the Qurʾān are discussed. While it is emphasized that the Qurʾān is an address in modernist contextualist approaches, it is stated that understanding the address requires having contextual information, therefore reading the address as a book evaporates meaning. Because, according to these approaches, the meaning is sought in the text with the transformation of address to book (verbal culture to written culture), thus the Qurʾān is converted from a literal meaning into a system. Knowing what the Qurʾān tells and why it tells that, depends on the comprehension of all the contextual elements of the Qurʾān, which was sent as an address. In fact, knowledge of when, where and when the Qurʾān was sent about what events and to whom it is addressed, is the data that is primarily considered in the comprehension of the verses, as emphasized by the classical interpretation literature. However, the perception of the classical interpretation evaluates these data in different categories in terms of the integrity of religion, judgment and experience. For example, the narrations on the reason of sending and the Makki-Madani information are only examples of the meanings of the verses. They sometimes serve as elements that contribute to the comprehension of the verses, while sometimes with the help of other chapters they can narrow the meanings of the verses. The realist-methodological basis of the method science provides the emergence of this holistic-categorical perspective.It is difficult to justify the claim that there is an absolute relationship between the address and the addressee in terms of the classical literature. In the classical literature, the expressions, which come in the form of an address and have a mandatory relationship with addressees, are dealt with the concept of direct address. Direct addresses are binding for the first addressees. Because when an address is mentioned, it is mandatory to have an addressee. It can be assumed that this discourse has the same position with the context theories considering its premises. However, it is not possible to compare these theories with each other in terms of the scope of the address. Classical theories of reasoning consider that direct addresses cover indirect addressees by methods, such as shar’i (legal) necessity or analogy (qiyas), while contextualists and historians can convert the text beyond the virtual level by identifying what a command means within the context of the address-addressee relationship. When the Qurʾān is completely considered as an address, or when direct addresses are taken into consideration, it is very difficult for the modern period's comprehension methods that the verses, which mention or address the disbelievers-polytheists, can also address Muslims. In fact, the dialectic of the address-addressee requires this. Moreover, the addressees (polytheists-Muslims) who are spoken within the context of the verses have two different beliefs that cannot be dealt with at the same time and mentioned in the same verse. Therefore, it is not possible to direct the messages given to the polytheists to the believers and to attribute the qualities in these verses to Muslims.However, the classical literature did not even consider as a problem to address Muslims with the verses that directly addressing unbelievers-polytheists. It is because both linguistics and facts requires this. The method practitioners and interpreters discussed this issue in a very wide range. They examined the transitivity of the book between parties, such as people of the book-Muslims, Muslims-unbelievers, Prophet-ummah. In the context of the interpretation literature and the perception of modern-day interpretation, the possibility of the transitivity of the book can be clarified in the context of the inclusiveness of a verse that speaks of polytheists-disbelievers to include Muslims, or the conversion of an address to polytheists-unbelievers to Muslims. Classical literature explains this point sometimes with the literal indication (circularization) and the circumstance of literary use of language (rhetoric) and sometimes with the possibility of the address (stylistic features).In verses and hadiths, belief bases categorical classes, such as believers, unbelievers, polytheists, hypocrites, people of the book are mentioned, as well as descriptions of the characteristic-practical dimensions of these classes. In this context, commands sometimes refer to the practices that need to be performed in order to be a believer, sometimes works that must not be performed by the believer, and sometimes matters that might put the believer's faith-practice integrity at risk when it is done. In the Qurʾān, in some of the addresses to the believers, it is apparent that they are prohibited from being like unbelievers or having unbeliever-like qualities. Moreover, sometimes negative results that may arise for Muslims when they act like unbelievers are cited in the verses. Sometimes at the end of the verses that address and mention Muslims, information is included on situations involving unbelievers and the torment they will encounter. In addition, in cases where adjectives belonging to opposing belief profiles are mentioned, the address to non-Muslims expresses warning, evaluation, gratitude and perseverance in faith for Muslims, while the address to Muslims contains elements of incentive and opportunity for non-Muslim groups. It is possible to justify this matter with the style of the Qurʾān. However, it can be said that the transitivity of the address in the Qurʾān takes place in two theoretical aspects. The first of these is related to linguistic-rhetoric premises and it is used in antithesis, allusion, metaphor etc. The second one is the similitude-comparison. Here, the comparison is a phenomenon that occurs in the mind without the need for propositions. Because when the mind hears these statements, it can instantly reach a stronger meaning than the literal wording. In this study, it is discussed whether it is possible to transition from direct addresses to indirect addressees, with reference to the problems of the modern period. In this context, the study primarily focuses on the fact that the Qurʾān sometimes transmits its messages and teachings to addressees through opposing belief systems. Thus, the manner adopted by the Qurʾān while directing certain commands and negations, not directly but through the opposing side, has been presented. In this study, the possibility of the verses that only mentions polytheists-unbelievers to also addressing Muslims was analyzed and these verses were compared with addresses to Muslims on the same matters. In the last part of the study, a theoretical framework was drawn on the subject and the method of interdisciplinary transitivity was determined. (shrink)

This article blends psychological and social factors in the explanation of science, and defends the compatibility of a psychosocial picture with an epistemic picture. It examines three variants of the 'political' approach to interpersonal persuasion advocated by Latour and others. In each case an 'epistemic' or mixed account is more promising and empirically better supported. Psychological research on motivated reasoning shows the epistemic limits of interest-driven belief. Against social constructivism, the paper defends the viability of a truth-based standard, (...) and reports how truth-possession can be promoted even when scientific work is motivated by political/professional considerations. (shrink)

Epistemology should accommodate both psychological and social dimensions of knowledge. My framework, called 'epistemics,' divides into individual and social epistemics. Primary individual epistemics, which is closely allied with cognitive science, studies the epistemic properties of basic cognitive operations. Examples are given, focusing on belief perseverance, imagery, deductive reasoning, and acceptance (as modeled by the "connectionist" approach). Social epistemics targets such things as communication practices and institutional characteristics for epistemic evaluation. Rejecting relativism, I defend objective, truth-based, standards of evaluation. (...) The help of social science is enlisted in studying the truth-linked properties of alternative practices and institutions, such as methods of weighting individual judgments in forming a collective judgment. (shrink)

Socioscientific issues receive considerable public attention and there are concerns that people in general are not able or willing to deal with information at odds with what they believe to be true. In this study, we focused on students’ beliefs about two controversial issues: whether consumption of the artificial sweetener aspartame and use of cell phones, respectively, represent any serious health risks. Our aim was to investigate whether students’ trust in the information was related to prior beliefs, the nature of (...) the message, and students’ critical reading strategies. Results showed interactions between prior beliefs about the issues and text condition (risk vs. no risk) on trust in conclusions that indicated a confirmation bias assumption. Additionally, students trusted conclusions ascertaining that there were risks more than conclusions ascertaining that there were no risks. Finally, students’ self-reported use of critical reading strategies implied less trust in both types of conclusions. (shrink)

The article presents the conceptualization of philosophical education, in the context of which the evolution of the development of society from informational to smart society takes place. The purpose of the article is to reveal the conceptualization of philosophical education in the context of the idea of a smart society and to show that philosophical education does not stand still but develops along with the development of science and technology, which requires the development of a conceptual and categorical apparatus. Research (...) objectives: to show the development of philosophical knowledge, in the context of which new innovative ideas are ripening; to reveal that the concept of a smart society is based on the expectation or belief in the ability of modern smart technologies to positively influence social processes and lead to a new qualitative state of all social life, which is called a smart society; to prove that much in solving all these problems depends on the state of education, including philosophical and ideological, not only developing our cognitive abilities, but also forming a responsible and demanding attitude to goal setting, the choice of basic life values. Analysis of recent research and publications, which presents a solution to this problem. We rely on the works of I.Ardashkin, V.Voronkova, M.Kastels, O.Kivlyuk, K.Korsak, A.Lazarevich, R.Oleksenko, O.Punchenko, which in one way or another reflected the problem of the formation of a smart society. The research methodology is the dialectical, historical, systemic, informational methods, which allowed to penetrate deeply into the evolution of philosophical knowledge that is not in mass, but develops with the development of science, technique and technology. The result of research - based smart society the development of information and computer technologies that lead to breakthrough technologies and innovative development It is noted that the proposed reorganization of the system of social-humanitarian education in the universities of the Republic of Belarus intended to raise to the level of philosophical training of domestic specialists. (shrink)

(Axiological Systems in the XXI century: A Collage. The downfall of axiological systems based on beliefs and the co-existence of varied beliefs in the spiritual market) - DOI – 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n28p1295 Resumen Pretendemos mostrar como los sistemas axiológicos de creencias provenientes de las religiones no están vigentes en la actualidad. Para ello mostramos algunos datos del Banco Mundial que muestran como los sistemas heterónomos de creencias no funcionan como orientadores de la vida personal y social del individuo. También facilitamos información (...) sobre la disminución de los que se autoadscriben como pertenecientes a un sistema de creencias y además demostramos mediante las estadísticas que no existe relación entre autoadscribirse como miembro de un sistema de creencias y mantener unas determinadas creencias. Clarificamos la noción de creencia comúnmente utilizada como supuesto acrítico y otros usos del lenguaje corriente y del lenguaje científico. Utilizamos estadísticas de Catalunya, España, y de algunos países de Europa y América. Concluimos que si los sistemas axiológicos de los individuos no vienen determinados por las religiones, entonces ¿qué sistemas axiológicos tenemos que sean capaces de cohesionar y motivar los individuos hacia fines valiosos comunes? Palabras clave : Sistemas Axiológicos. Creencias. Religión. Cualidad humana. Estadísticas. España católicaWe aim at showing why axiological systems coming from religion are not operative currently. To do this we show World Bank data where it is manifested that heteronomous systems of beliefs are not in force to orient the personal and social life of the individuals. We also communicate the declining numbers of those that register themselves as believers and we also reveal that there is no relationship between registering oneself as a believer in an axiological system and effectively holding and “believing” the beliefs of that axiological system. We clarify the common use of the term belief as a non-critical assumption, and other uses of the term in natural language and scientific language. We use statistical data for Catalonia, Spain and some countries of Europe and America. We conclude by asking if individuals’ axiological systems are not determined by religions, then What axiological systems do we have able to cohere and motivate individuals towards valuable common futures? Keywords: Axiological systems. Beliefs, Religion. Human Quality. Statistics. Spain Catholic. (shrink)

According to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe (...) what we're told, is not widespread. Peet doesn't identify any problem with his own argument though he does attempt to limit its sceptical potential by identifying special contexts in which TBVs stand a chance of success. A more general defence of TBVs can be provided by showing Peet's argument to be unsound. I argue that Peet's argument is unsound because it requires us to wrongly suppose that speakers do far less labour than their audiences in context-sensitive linguistic communication. I aim to show why—in the context of the epistemology of testimony and the philosophy of language—it's important to recognize the labour that speakers can do, and so can can be held responsible for not doing, in episodes of context-sensitive linguistic communication. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can (...) never be more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted. (shrink)

Experience and reason, it has been claimed, provide the bases of religious belief. The first and fourth groups of selections in Mr. Yandell’s collection of readings probe this claim. In these sections, as in the two intervening ones primary sources are followed by critical analyses and appraisals. Thus, when religious experience is being considered selections from the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist scriptures, and the Old and New Testaments are followed by commentaries drawn from writers such as William James, (...) Rudolf Otto, and John Baillie. Generally, primary materials are selected from "traditional" thinkers, while analyses are drawn from more contemporary ones. For example, the problem of evil is set by Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, and discussed by J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, and Dewey Hoitenga. Those authors who are included are readable, and the readings mesh well. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the miraculous largely in the context of Western philosophy of religion and therefore largely in the context of a concern with Christianity. The main elements of the discussion are: A definition of the miraculous, basically a modified version of David Hume’s notion of a divinely caused violation of a law of nature; a brief discussion of the main functions which religious thought seems to assign to miracles. I divide these roles into two categories. One involves some epistemic (...) effect, such as providing someone with a basis or justification for belief. The other involves some other, non-epistemic, effect, such as providing physical healing,spiritual salvation, etc. A further discussion of epistemic concerns, mostly about the role of miracles as evidence for some belief, and the converse role of evidenceas justifying a belief in miracles; a further discussion of testimonial evidence in particular, and of how such evidence properly bears on judgments of probability. (shrink)

Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes (...) which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes. (shrink)

Purpose of the study is explication of ethical and existential conditions of realization of human responsibility for the protection and recreation of the environment on a scale of the common world with all the other living beings. The crisis of the environment is the crisis of human morality. For responsible environmental management, it is necessary to form the ecological consciousness of society and reinterpret the anthropocentrism on the ethical foundations. The theoretical basis of the research is the analysis of ethical (...) and existential dimensions of understanding of the human environment ranging from the sphere of the home and the natural environment to the dimension of the common world of people and all the entities. The work clarifies the genesis of the concept of home from the ancient "oikos", household to the idea of home as a "hub", a base for mental and physical mobility in the contemporary technosphere. Correspondent to the transformation of the living world of mankind is the concept of communication and universal discourse of norms and values of human coexistence of J. Habermas, К.-О. Apel, D. Böhler, W. Kuhlmann, and others. The domain of the ecological consciousness and behaviour also requires motivation at the level of human feelings, beliefs, and convictions, which is represented by the philosophic and religious thought of H. Jonas, O. Leopold, K. M. Меуеr-Abich, A. Naess, the pope Francis, and others. As the result, the study proves the relevance of the concept of care about the common home based on the recognition of the value of the existence of all beings. Originality. The study explicates the genesis and meaning of the ethos of the common home with values of love, care, openness, solidarity, freedom, and responsibility which is proved to be the ethical and existential condition of the solution of the environmental crisis. The traditional anthropocentrism is reinterpreted towards the duty of people to be the centre of the responsibility for the existence of all beings that requires both reason and care. Conclusions. The ethics of care for our common home completes the moral duty of people as providers of the universal discourse who represent the interests of all beings. Concern for the preservation of the human environment and of all creation makes it possible for humanity to realize its universal responsibility in the world. The contemporaneous science and religious thought modify anthropocentrism to the holistic ethical understanding of human’s mission to be responsible for all beings. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus in Britain on the importance of character, and on the belief that the virtues that contribute to good character are part of the solution to many of the challenges facing modern society. Parents, teachers and schools understand the need to teach basic moral virtues to pupils, such as honesty, self-control, fairness, and respect, while fostering behaviour associated with such virtues today. However, until recently, the materials required to help deliver this ambition have been missing (...) in Britain. The Knightly Virtues Programme, devised by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, aims to help solve this challenge. The programme, designed for 9 to 11 year olds, draws on selected classic stories to help teach moral character in schools. This approach has proved to be popular with children and teachers, with more than 5,000 pupils from one hundred schools having participated in the programme so far. Fifty-five of these schools and 3,272 pupils were directly involved in different stages of the research. Based at the University of Birmingham, the Jubilee Centre houses leading academics dedicated to researching the various ways in which good character, which underpins the building blocks of society, can be developed. Recent research from the Centre has shown that the qualities that make up character can be learnt and taught, and suggests that we need a new emphasis on their importance in schools and in professional education. This report from the Centre into the use of classic literature within schools sets out the ways in which the Knightly Virtues Programme is able to develop the virtue literacy of school pupils, and the extent to which an understanding and awareness of good moral character can make positive changes to behaviour. The impact of the programme has been tested using several rigorous research methods, detailed in this report alongside their findings, which provide substantial empirical evidence for the effectiveness of using stories to develop virtue literacy. (shrink)

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit (...) belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief. (shrink)

Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or (...) can testimony generate epistemic features in its own right? Second, is justified dependence on testimony fundamentally basic, or is it ultimately reducible to other epistemic sources, such as perception, memory, and reason? Testimony itself is typically understood quite broadly so as to include a variety of acts of communication that are intended or taken to convey information—such as statements, nods, pointings, and so on. (For a full development of this view, see Lackey 2008.) Knowledge that is distinctively testimonial requires belief that is based or grounded in, not merely caused by, an instance of testimony. For instance, suppose that I sing “I have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice and you come to believe this entirely on the basis of hearing my soprano voice. (This is a variation of an example found in Audi 1997.) While my testimony is certainly causally relevant to the formation of your belief, the resulting knowledge is based on your hearing my soprano voice rather than on what I testified to, thereby rendering it perceptual in nature. What is of import for distinctively testimonial knowledge is that a given belief be formed on the basis of the content of a speaker’s testimony. This prevents beliefs that are formed entirely on the basis of features about a speaker’s testimony from qualifying as instances of testimonial knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism and (...) anti-reductionism are compatible after all. Therefore, being an anti-reductionist with regard to testimonial justification doesn’t force one to reject epistemic internalism. In order to argue for this result, I will make use of resources provided by speech act theory. (shrink)

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit (...) belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief. (shrink)